Nigeria: Is the jihadist expansion really solely driven by local groups?

For more than a decade, West Africa has faced a continuous increase in violence attributed to jihadist groups. Despite operations led by national armies, particularly in the countries of the Sahel States Alliance, these organizations retain significant action capacity and gradually extend their activities towards coastal states.

The northern part of Benin and certain regions of Nigeria are directly exposed to this evolution. Their proximity to Niger and Burkina Faso, where several armed groups are entrenched, makes them particularly sensitive areas.

Among the main organizations active in the region is the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, commonly referred to by its acronym JNIM. Affiliated with Al-Qaeda, it combines military operations, pressure on populations, and, in certain territories, forms of negotiation with local communities.

This ability to adapt its methods to local realities has allowed it to strengthen its influence in several rural areas of the Sahel. The group seeks to exploit community conflicts, economic difficulties, weak public services, and the feeling of abandonment experienced by certain populations.

Competition Among Various Armed Organizations

The expansion of JNIM occurs in an environment marked by competition from other groups, notably the Islamic State in the Sahel. This organization is primarily active in the so-called three borders area, between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Security analyses report a gradual extension of its areas of interest towards the south, towards the borders of Benin and northwestern Nigeria. Operations claimed on Nigerian territory in 2026 have heightened concerns about a possible connection between hotspots in central Sahel and groups present in the country’s northwest.

Nigeria remains concurrently confronted with the Islamic State in West Africa, or ISWAP. Based in the Lake Chad basin, this organization is one of the most organized jihadist structures in the region.

Despite military campaigns conducted by Nigeria and its neighbors, ISWAP retains significant operational capabilities. The group regularly carries out attacks against military positions, infrastructure, and civilian populations in northeastern Nigeria.

Factions that emerged from Boko Haram also remain active, although their influence and organization have evolved due to internal clashes and counter-insurgency operations.

This situation places Nigeria before two main threat hotspots. In the northeast, security forces confront ISWAP and elements still active from Boko Haram. In the northwest, they must monitor the emergence of armed groups likely to have links with organizations based in the Sahel.

The Lakurawa group is regularly mentioned in this context. Active in the border areas of northwestern Nigeria, it is described in several analyses as an organization with connections to jihadist networks operating in Niger. However, the exact nature of its affiliations, level of autonomy, and extent of its capabilities remain debated.

The proliferation of these hotspots risks leading to a dispersion of Nigerian military resources. Abuja must simultaneously secure the Lake Chad basin, monitor western borders, and address other forms of insecurity, particularly armed banditry and kidnappings.

Funding Primarily from Local Economies

The resilience of armed groups also raises questions about their funding sources. Research on Sahelian jihadism identifies several mechanisms, including cross-border trafficking, smuggling, extortion, kidnappings for ransom, cattle rustling, and taxation of economic activities.

In certain areas under their influence, armed organizations impose levies on traders, transporters, herders, or operators of natural resources. They may also recover weapons and equipment during attacks against defense forces.

Hard-to-control borders, the flow of weapons from regional conflicts, and the existence of informal trading networks facilitate this clandestine economy.

Accusations targeting foreign powers, notably France, are regularly made in political debate and on social media. Some actors assert that external countries deliberately foster insecurity to maintain their strategic influence in the region.

However, these claims should be presented with caution. No public and independent evidence currently establishes that France trains, equips, or finances jihadist groups from Benin territory. French military cooperation with Benin is officially presented as support for training, intelligence, and capacity building for national forces.

Critics of this cooperation nonetheless demand greater transparency regarding the presence of foreign personnel, the nature of training provided, the infrastructures used, and the agreements governing these activities.

These questions are further underscored by the deterioration of relations between France and the countries of the Sahel States Alliance. Following the withdrawal of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, Paris has sought to maintain or develop its partnerships with other African states, notably in the Gulf of Guinea.

This reorientation is interpreted by some observers as an adaptation of the French strategy in response to the loss of its former positions in the Sahel. However, it does not, by itself, constitute proof of involvement in the activities of armed groups.

Benin and Nigeria Facing a Cross-Border Threat

Benin occupies a strategic position in the fight against the expansion of violence towards coastal countries. The northern part of the country has recorded several attacks against defense forces and civilian populations in recent years.

Armed groups can exploit forested areas, border porosity, and surveillance difficulties to move between Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. This mobility does not necessarily mean that Benin territory constitutes an organized base or a permanent “hub.”

However, it demonstrates that strictly national responses are insufficient against organizations capable of crossing borders, recruiting locally, and adapting their operational methods.

For Nigeria, the challenge is to avoid a lasting connection between groups in the Lake Chad basin and networks active in central Sahel. Such an evolution would further complicate the security situation and could create a vast space of instability linking northeastern and northwestern Nigeria.

Responding to this threat requires enhanced regional cooperation, better intelligence sharing, and more effective control of financial and logistical flows. It also involves addressing local factors exploited by armed groups, including poverty, land conflicts, youth unemployment, and the lack of public services in certain areas.

Foreign partnerships can contribute to building military and technical capacities. However, they must be framed by transparent agreements and remain under the authority of national institutions.