Over 80 years old, Adrien Houngbédji seems to refuse to bow out and reignites the national debate with surprising positions, while blurring the lines between power and opposition in a Benin seeking democratic respite. The former President of Parliament challenges the choices of the power he long supported. Strategy or rupture?
Founded in 1990 following the National Conference, Adrien Houngbédji’s Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) established itself as one of the pillars of the young Beninese democracy. Maître Adrien Houngbédji, a lawyer by training born in 1942, is the founding president and has played a major role in the country’s political life for more than three decades. He was three times President of the National Assembly (1991-1995, 1999-2003, and 2015-2019), thus occupying the perch more often than any other Beninese politician.
He was also Prime Minister under President Mathieu Kérékou (1996-1998) and an unsuccessful candidate in several presidential elections, reaching, for example, 36% of the vote against Boni Yayi in 2011 (compared to 53% for the latter). A man of dialogue known for his moderation, Houngbédji—whom some nickname the “patriarch”—has always presented himself as an artisan of peace and consensus on the national stage.
With its rainbow symbol, the PRD was long the voice of a centrist and progressive sensibility, strongly anchored in Porto-Novo and the Ouémé region, and participated in numerous government coalitions or opposition alliances depending on the changes in power.
From alliance with power to first disagreements
While the PRD has historically been part of the opposition (notably against the regime of President Boni Yayi in the 2000s), it has occasionally moved closer to the ruling power. Adrien Houngbédji did not hesitate to ally with his former adversaries when realpolitik demanded it—evidenced by his decisive support for Mathieu Kérékou in the second round of the 1996 presidential election, which earned him the position of Prime Minister the following year.
More recently, at the end of Boni Yayi’s term, Houngbédji was able to access the presidency of Parliament in 2015 thanks to a coalition of parties opposed to Yayi. The rise to power of Patrice Talon in 2016 also marked a turning point when the former opposition leader Houngbédji became an ally of the new administration. The PRD joined the presidential movement and even officially supported Patrice Talon’s re-election in 2021.
At the same time, President Talon undertook profound reforms of the partisan system to reduce political fragmentation. These strict reforms—establishment of a demanding electoral code and the obligation for parties to have a national base—led to a political crisis during the April 2019 legislative elections, where only two pro-Talon formations were able to compete. The PRD, not having obtained its receipt in time, was excluded from the ballot, as were the other opposition parties, depriving Houngbédji of any parliamentary seat for the first time since 1991.
Faced with this setback, the old party had to consider its survival in another form. In August 2022, Adrien Houngbédji thus agreed to merge the PRD into the large presidential ensemble of the Progressive Union, renamed for the occasion the Progressive Union for Renewal (UPR). This decision—experienced as a sacrifice by many activists—aimed to guarantee a place for the PRD in the new political configuration. Houngbédji justified this merger by assuring that it did not mean the disappearance of his movement.
“We are members of the UPR. We did not join to leave. We are here to stay, but not to disappear,” he asserted in early 2025 during a meeting with his supporters. The very logo of the UPR, adorned with a rainbow accompanied by the word “Renewal,” is an explicit nod to the legacy of the PRD within this coalition.
Thanks to this alliance strategy, Adrien Houngbédji remained for several years a steadfast supporter of the Talon regime, endorsing its major orientations. For example, he voted (as President of the National Assembly) for the electoral and institutional laws now criticized for their severity towards the opposition. The integration of the PRD into the majority allowed him to place some of his executives back in office and to maintain a certain influence, at least symbolically, on the political scene. However, this rallying came at the cost of a significant loss of autonomy for the rainbow party, now merged into a mega-formation dominated by other barons of the movement.
At the end of 2022 and in 2023, nothing seemed to distinguish the PRD—as a component of the UPR—from the government line. However, starting in 2024, cracks began to appear, preluding a more pronounced change in posture in 2025.
A discourse that stands out within the movement
It was truly in 2025 that the tone changed for Adrien Houngbédji. Taking advantage of public occasions, the octogenarian leader expressed unexpected positions, at odds with the line of power he had previously supported. On February 2, 2025, during the PRD’s New Year’s wishes ceremony in Porto-Novo, Houngbédji surprised by delivering an indictment against the Beninese political climate. He attributed the current situation to “political exclusion” and pleaded for national reconciliation, calling for the return of exiles and the release of political prisoners.
“My strong conviction is that we must release the prisoners, those who are in exile, they must return. I call for us to meet under the talking tree. That’s how we succeeded with the Conference,” he told his supporters, invoking the memory of the great consultation of 1990.
These remarks echo those made in recent years by the main opponents of the regime—including former presidents Nicéphore Soglo and Thomas Boni Yayi, who have been calling for political appeasement measures. Seeing Houngbédji, until then an ally of the power, embrace these demands is surprising to the political class.
The real break in tone came a few weeks later, on April 15, 2025, during the Summit of Beninese Youth in Cotonou. Invited as a “great witness” of national political history, Adrien Houngbédji delivered a speech highly critical of the current governance—a criticism all the more resounding as it came from a member of the movement. “The political history of Benin, 35 years after the National Conference: what perspective from 1990 to today?” was the theme of his intervention. Before an audience of young people, the former President of Parliament expressed his concern about a democracy he considers in decline. He denounced a “legislative lockdown” that restricts political participation and pointed to the current electoral code, which he considers a carefully crafted instrument of exclusion to marginalize the opposition.
“Democracy is not about eliminating your opponents by changing the rules of the game,” Houngbédji declared to applause.
Recalling the precedent of the 2019 legislative elections—which he described as wahala elections (marred by troubles)—he insisted on the imperative need for an inclusive ballot. For him, “the opposition must necessarily go to the elections. There is no democracy without opposition,” he affirmed, aligning almost perfectly with the discourse of the radical opposition to the Talon regime.
Houngbédji did not stop there. He also urged the government to unconditionally release political detainees and allow the safe return of exiles. According to him, the maintenance of these exceptional measures undermines social cohesion.
At 83 years old, having lived through all the regimes, he recalled a time—before 2016—when power and opposition managed to coexist with mutual respect. “I presided over the National Assembly under several Presidents of the Republic, and we always found ways of consensus and mutual respect. But since 2016, things have taken a different turn…” he lamented, implicitly drawing the balance of a rupture he attributes to the current governance. This fundamental criticism targets the heart of the system established by Patrice Talon, often accused of silencing his opponents through tailor-made laws and judicial proceedings.
Houngbédji’s public intervention had a strong media impact. On one hand, public opinion opposed to the power welcomed the “awakening” of a veteran who dared to say aloud what the opposition has been saying since 2019. On the other hand, indignant reactions erupted within the presidential camp, where the democracy lesson given by a supposedly loyal ally was poorly received. According to indiscretions, these statements caused strong tensions among the majority’s executives, some accusing the “patriarch” Houngbédji of dangerously deviating from the line of support for the regime. Some government members even publicly made insulting remarks about him, proof of the tension caused by this unexpected outburst.
Faced with this rebellion, the PRD did not take long to react. In an official statement published on April 17, 2025, its Deputy General Secretariat denounced a “campaign of denigration” against Adrien Houngbédji and expressed its “deep indignation” at the personal attacks against him. The party condemned the “insulting and unworthy remarks” made by “certain political figures, including members of the government,” which it deemed contrary to civilized democratic debate. Recalling that its leader is “a man of peace and experience” always ready to promote national unity and dialogue, the PRD called for “mutual respect” and invited the institutions of the Republic to put an end to these verbal excesses detrimental to the country’s image.
In short, the PRD fully endorsed its president’s remarks and positioned itself as a guarantor of freedom of expression against attacks from its own political camp. This unprecedented sequence consecrated the existence of a gap between Adrien Houngbédji (and the PRD base) and the rest of the presidential movement. Officially a member of the majority, the old party seemed in reality to regain its autonomy of speech, even if it meant defying the government’s line.
Strategic Repositioning, Tactical Rapprochement, or Loss of Influence?
What should we make of Adrien Houngbédji’s attitude? Is it a finely calculated political gamble or the last stand of a declining actor? Opinions differ among Beninese political analysts and actors.
Hypothesis 1: the repositioning maneuver
For many observers, Houngbédji is primarily seeking to reposition himself politically in anticipation of upcoming deadlines. With less than two years until the 2026 general elections (legislative coupled with presidential), the veteran feels the need to distinguish himself from the regime to re-emerge on the national stage. Deputy Assan Séibou, a member of the presidential majority, sees in these positions a clear calculation of positioning. Adrien Houngbédji “seeks to redefine his image and seduce a new electoral base,” he stated in a column, denouncing the “political opportunism” of such a turnaround.
Indeed, Houngbédji seems to want to manage his exit from Talonism to avoid being swept away by a potential wave of change in 2026. By already distancing himself from the most contested aspects of the Talon regime (restrictive laws, exclusion of the opposition, etc.), he undoubtedly hopes to reposition himself as a sage of the nation above the fray, a role in which he could weigh in during the succession at the top of the state.
This strategy of preventive repositioning would consist of regaining the confidence of a part of the public opinion opposed to the power, without formally breaking with the majority—at least not before the electoral deadline. A risky tightrope act, but potentially rewarding if the wind changes.
Hypothesis 2: tactical rapprochement with the opposition
Others believe that Houngbédji is seeking less to isolate himself than to forge new ties—specifically with the traditional opposition. His recent demands (reforms of the electoral code, inclusion of all parties, release of opponents) are exactly those put forward by the main opposition party, Les Démocrates de Boni Yayi. By endorsing them, the PRD leader is sending signals of goodwill to his former adversaries. It is notable, for example, that Houngbédji’s statements in favor of exiles and national dialogue align with those made by Nicéphore Soglo and Boni Yayi in recent months.
More concretely, there is a personal rapprochement between these figures. On February 2, 2025, former President Boni Yayi visited Adrien Houngbédji’s home in Porto-Novo to present his New Year’s wishes, a courteous but highly symbolic visit that took place in a “very fraternal and convivial” atmosphere. Yayi did not skimp on praise for the one he now calls his “big brother.” This public embrace between two former bitter rivals of the 2011 presidential election suggests that a political reconciliation is underway. Houngbédji could thus be preparing a tacit alliance with the opposition ahead of 2026. Either to form a united front against a heir of the Talon regime, or to weigh in on the discussions about the reforms to be implemented before the deadline.
In short, the PRD would seek to become a kingmaker again, capable of monetizing its support with the opposition after having long supported the power. It is a strategy of external repositioning, a realignment of political friendships that would allow the PRD not to be isolated when the current majority fractures.
Hypothesis 3: admission of a loss of influence
Finally, a third—more cynical—interpretation sees in Houngbédji’s moves the symptom of a weakening of his political weight. For his detractors, his current indignation at the exclusion of the opposition is a belated and self-interested realization. They point out that the PRD leader has been a part of all the major decisions of the Rupture regime. “Far from exclusion, he was intimately linked to the management of Patrice Talon’s power,” recalls He Assan Séibou, noting that Houngbédji supported the reforms and even merged his party with the UP. Seeing the former President of the Assembly now denounce “liberticidal” laws that he himself helped to adopt is open to accusation. “He now seems to want to distance himself from the reforms he himself supported,” deplores Séibou, who sees a major contradiction.
From the side of power, some see above all the frustration of a sidelined ally. Indeed, despite the 2022 merger, the PRD did not obtain decisive positions. No major ministry for its executives, and in the January 2023 legislative elections, the UPR won only a few seats in Houngbédji’s traditional stronghold of Ouémé, against the opposition. In short, the operation to save the PRD within the majority resulted in a mixed, even “disastrous” balance sheet, as some disillusioned supporters admit. Therefore, according to his critics, Houngbédji is turning around out of opportunism, to try to regain declining influence.
The octogenarian would be playing for his own political survival, aware that he no longer holds any official function and that his party, dissolved, exists only through him.
These criticisms also recall that this is not Houngbédji’s first turnaround. In the past, he had already joined the presidential majority in 2003 after years of opposition, then retreated into the opposition under Yayi, before rallying to Talon in 2016. This ability to “eat at all troughs,” they say, undermines his credibility. There is talk of a permanent “political bargaining” on the part of the PRD leader, who forms and breaks alliances according to his interests of the moment. His recent indignation would therefore, in the eyes of his adversaries, be less dictated by democratic principles than by the disappointment of no longer being part of the inner circle of power.
What about the future of the PRD?
Beyond the person of Adrien Houngbédji, it is the very future of the PRD that is at stake in this new posture. Founded in 1990, the party officially disappeared as an autonomous structure when it merged into the UPR in 2022. At first glance, the PRD as such no longer exists, absorbed into a larger formation. However, Houngbédji never ceases to repeat that his party of always “will not disappear.” He strongly claims the survival of the PRD identity within the UPR: the rainbow in the logo, the mention “Renewal” attached to the name of the Progressive Union, all this “did not come by chance,” he points out.
For him, the PRD remains a political family, an ideology, and a militant network, even if it is no longer a label on the ballots. His recent phrase—”We are in the UPR to stay, but not to disappear”—summarizes all the ambition of the leader, namely to keep the flame of the PRD alive while waiting for better days. And indeed, despite the merger, Houngbédji continues to nurture this flame.
“Far from a total dissolution of the PRD in the new political structure, the historic leader seems to maintain a still vibrant flame, ready to rekindle the enthusiasm of his militants,” notes a local journalist after his speech in February 2025.
What could be the outcomes of this situation in the medium term? Several scenarios are emerging for the PRD.
The Path of Internal Resilience
Houngbédji could choose to remain within the UPR while advocating, from within, the values of the PRD. This cautious option would involve leveraging his moral weight to influence the majority’s line, obtain a relaxation of the electoral code, and the gradual reintegration of a legal opposition. If the bet succeeds and the political space opens up again, the PRD, even integrated into the UPR, could claim to have contributed to it. However, this choice carries the risk of total dilution, as by remaining in the shadow of the UPR, the PRD could lose what remains of its visibility and end up merging with its new political family.
The Rebirth of the PRD on the Electoral Scene
Many speculate about a solo return of the PRD once President Patrice Talon departs. 2026, which will theoretically mark the end of Talon’s last term, appears as a turning point. Some suggest that after 2026, Houngbédji would want the PRD to regain its independence. Concretely, this would involve reviving the party (or creating a new one on the same bases) and launching again into the electoral arena under the colors of “Renewal.” Such a scenario would, however, suppose that the legal framework allows it, as today, the creation of new parties and obtaining the famous receipt are subject to draconian conditions. It would therefore be necessary either for a legislative evolution (which Houngbédji calls for) or for an unwavering determination of PRD militants to rebuild the party apparatus.
Moreover, the PRD version 2.0 would have to reconquer its traditional electorate, particularly in Ouémé and Plateau. These strongholds, once loyal to Houngbédji, have partly fallen into the hands of the young party Les Démocrates in the last legislative elections. The challenge would be to rally these populations again by capitalizing on the nostalgia of the PRD era and on the discontent with the management of the rupture.
The Role of Arbitrator or Pivotal Ally
If the PRD does not become a fully independent party again, it could nevertheless play a pivotal ally role in the upcoming recompositions. One can imagine, for example, that Houngbédji and his loyalists serve as a link in a large anti-Talon coalition if the presidential camp were to fracture as 2026 approaches. Thanks to his status as a former figure of both the movement and the opposition, Houngbédji has a unique cross-cutting profile. He is one of the few who can still dialogue with everyone—both the barons of power (with whom he has shared the struggle in recent years) and the leaders of the historical opposition (with whom he is making common cause on principles).
This median position could make him indispensable in behind-the-scenes negotiations—for example, to designate a consensus candidate or to prepare a smooth transition. In this perspective, the PRD’s party label matters less than Houngbédji’s leadership itself, as a respected patriarch. The risk for the PRD would be that after Houngbédji, the party does not survive him, as so far, no natural successor has emerged, and the new generation has largely migrated to other political horizons.