In Benin, the silent standoff between the UPR and the BR in the face of the 2026 general elections

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Benin is preparing for general elections in 2026 (municipal in January and presidential in April). President Patrice Talon, elected in 2016 and re-elected in 2021, will reach the end of his second constitutional term in 2026 and has reaffirmed that he will not seek a third term. In accordance with the Beninese Constitution, which limits the number of presidential terms to two, he has promised to hand over power to his successor on the evening of May 26.

This situation paves the way for an unprecedented succession because, for the first time since 1990, less than a year before the deadline, no candidate has officially declared themselves, neither within the ruling majority nor in the opposition. This testifies to Patrice Talon’s total and complete control over the political game. The challenge for the presidential movement—the coalition of political forces supporting Talon—is therefore to preserve power in 2026 by designating a successor capable of winning and perpetuating the reforms and achievements of the current president’s two terms.

In 2019, the reform of the partisan system initiated during Talon’s first term rationalized the political landscape by grouping former formations into two major pro-government blocs, the Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR) and the Bloc Républicain (BR). These two “Siamese” parties of the presidential camp now dominate the institutions and, in principle, collaborate to support government action. However, behind the facade of unity, cracks and internal rivalries are apparent between these political giants.

The Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR)

The Union Progressiste le Renouveau was born in 2022 from the merger of the former Union Progressiste party with Adrien Houngbédji’s Parti du Renouveau Démocratique (PRD). With 53 deputies (a relative majority in the National Assembly) and a vast network of activists, the UPR is a pillar of the movement. Its current president, Joseph Djogbénou, a former Keeper of the Seals and former president of the Constitutional Court, is close to Talon and was one of the architects of the political reforms. In July 2022, veteran Bruno Amoussou handed over the leadership of the party to him, making Djogbénou a central figure in the Talon apparatus.

However, the internal unity of the UPR is far from secured. Djogbénou is not unanimously supported internally as a potential candidate for 2026. After the strategic meeting on April 28, 2025 (see next section), the man reportedly positioned himself, to the surprise of some, as the “natural candidate” of the UPR by invoking the party’s internal regulations and refusing the idea of competitive primaries. This statement shocked many executives, deemed “unacceptable from a major architect of the reforms.” Djogbénou is said to have even gone so far as to proclaim himself in private as the “first choice” of Patrice Talon, sparking indignation and rebellion among allies. His attitude then triggered a real leadership war within the UPR, with some denouncing his “unilateral injunctions” while he would not have the approval of President Talon to be the dauphin. Faced with this defiance, Patrice Talon “is not taking well” the behavior of his former lawyer, and it is expected that he will severely reprimand Djogbénou. But the rapprochement observed between the two men in recent weeks seems oriented towards a completely different path.

At the same time, the alliance with the original PRD has crumbled. Adrien Houngbédji, the veteran founder of the PRD, deplores a poorly managed merger with the absence of a founding congress of the UPR and the non-consideration of the original components. In February 2025, Houngbédji publicly marked his break with the presidential movement by denouncing the “policy of exclusion” and the “democratic regression” of the regime. He contests the “legal disappearance” of his party and considers resuming the autonomy of the PRD, even proposing the cancellation of the 2022 merger agreement. This internal crisis revealed the failure of the UPR-PRD “marriage” and creates uncertainty about the real extent of the UPR’s electoral base if the PRD resumes its separate path. Nevertheless, Talon’s entourage minimizes the impact of this departure, while recognizing that Houngbédji retains a non-negligible potential for harm if he switches to the opposition.

The Bloc Républicain (BR)

The Bloc Républicain, led by Minister of State Abdoulaye Bio Tchané (ABT), is the second major party in the movement. Also born in 2018-2019 from the political recomposition, it has slightly fewer deputies than the UPR (it held 28 out of 109 in the previous legislature) and has significant strongholds, particularly in the north of the country. ABT, a former presidential candidate in 2016 and an experienced figure, holds the position of national secretary general of the BR. However, at 71 years old, he is affected by the age limit set at 70 years to be a candidate in 2026, which automatically disqualifies him. Bio Tchané himself has indicated that he is not running for the race, which opens the way for a new generation of BR executives.

So far, the BR has been relatively discreet about its presidential ambitions. According to Deputy Assan Séibou, president of the BR parliamentary group, the party “can decide whether or not to have a candidate” for the presidential election, the essential being not to lose power in 2026. As early as 2023, he warned that they would not “impose a president” on him or support a candidate doomed to failure, which suggested a certain mistrust of a non-consensual single candidate. The BR is ready to present its own champion if circumstances require it, he affirmed. This measured position reflects an influence strategy because the party wants to weigh in on the final choice of the movement’s candidate, to ensure that he is capable of winning. Internally, no candidacy has yet been opened, but several figures could emerge (young ministers, influential deputies, etc.), especially since Bio Tchané is stepping aside, the competition is open. Officially, the watchword at the BR is still reserve. “We wait and observe,” confided an executive, while ensuring that the designation of the presidential duo will be done “harmoniously” among allies.

It should also be noted that small allied formations revolve around these two poles, such as Moele-Bénin by Jacques Ayadji or the Rennaissance Nationale (ex-UDBN) by Claduine Prudencio. These provide support without presenting their own candidate, but their leaders sometimes express dissenting voices. For example, Ayadji has issued nuanced criticisms of governance, and defector Bertin Koovi does not hesitate to publicly denounce certain dysfunctions of the Talon system. Without weighing as much as the UPR or the BR, these signals translate a “fire smoldering under the ashes” within the majority, marked by frustrations that could erupt as the deadline approaches.

A single candidacy strategy for 2026

Aware of the risk of division, the presidential camp is moving towards a single candidacy strategy for the April 2026 election. Patrice Talon has long maintained suspense, refusing to “designate” a dauphin early so as not to contradict his own partisan reform, which advocates the primacy of parties in the selection of candidates. Finally, a clear consensus emerged at the end of April 2025. During a decisive meeting on April 28 with the leaders of the UPR and the BR in the private residence of the head of state, Talon laid the groundwork for a plan to designate a unique duo from the majority. According to the terms of the agreement, each party will organize internal primaries to choose a president-vice president ticket, then a final conclave will arbitrate between the two duos to retain only one, on August 15, 2025, under the aegis of Patrice Talon. It is agreed that if the presidential candidate comes from one party, the vice-presidential running mate will come from the other, thus ensuring a balanced representation of UPR-BR in the final tandem.

This approach, inspired by American-style primaries, is an innovation in Beninese politics. It was rather well received at the announcement, with the majority’s activists declaring themselves satisfied to see a transparent and collegial process being put in place. As early as February 2025, the UPR had officialized its intention to organize primaries within six months for all the 2026 polls, including the designation of the presidential duo. Its spokesperson, Christian Ahoyo, insisted on an internal mechanism aimed at choosing “the best candidates capable of leading the party to victory,” with the concern of respecting the schedule set by the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (Céna). For its part, the BR should follow suit according to similar modalities, even if the party was initially more reserved about the option of a single candidacy from the first round.

Indeed, speculations had circulated at the beginning of 2024 about a scenario with two candidacies from the movement in the first round, with the UPR and the BR each presenting a candidate to settle their leadership, then rallying in the second round. This idea aimed to offer a kind of “life-size primary” while ensuring that the coalition occupied the field in the first round and regrouped afterwards. However, it seems that this option was discarded to favor unity from the first round—probably to avoid the risks of too acute fratricidal rivalry or a contestation of the results in case of an overwhelming victory from the first round.

The current watchword is therefore union. “On October 12, the candidate of the movement will be revealed to you,” announced the government spokesperson Wilfried Houngbédji. This date coincides with the official period for submitting candidacies (October 10 to 14, 2025) set by the Céna. Until then, the internal schedule provides for a gradual increase in power with the expression of ambitions within the parties during the summer of 2025, negotiations and the final choice in August, then the preparation of the investiture convention in the autumn.

It should also be noted that Patrice Talon intends to closely pilot this succession. While he is not running as a candidate, he is not abandoning the “choice of his successor.” His will is to preserve the achievements of his regime by placing a loyalist at the Marina in 2026. His approach has oscillated between a temptation to directly designate a dauphin and the need to compose with the appetites of his camp. Finally, by opening the game of internal primaries, Talon attempts to reconcile internal democracy within the parties and control of the schedule. His strategy also consists of delaying as much as possible the announcement of the chosen name. According to his close associates, revealing the dauphin too early would expose the latter to attacks from his rivals even before the campaign. By playing for time until October 2025, Talon hopes to avoid premature erosion of his champion. It is a delicate bet, as this temporization has also fueled a period of political uncertainty and some internal tensions.

Potential political figures as majority candidates

Several prominent personalities are circulating as potential presidential candidates from the majority side, even though no official declaration of candidacy has been made at this stage (in accordance with the group discipline imposed by Talon). Here are the main names mentioned in Beninese political and media circles:

Joseph Djogbénou (55 years old) – The president of the UPR logically appears among the favorites. A seasoned jurist and loyalist of Patrice Talon (of whom he was the personal legal advisor), he played a key role in institutional reforms. Having surprisingly become the leader of the main parliamentary party, Djogbénou “certainly does not have an aversion to power” and sees himself as a serious candidate for 2026. In any case, he has openly displayed his ambitions, at the risk of offending his allies as we have seen. If he manages to rally the UPR behind him, his candidacy would carry weight, but his solitary approach has also weakened his position. Influential voices judge his methods “unacceptable” and recall that Talon has not made him his favorite so far. The head of state might even seek to sideline him if he considers that Djogbénou threatens the unity of the camp. The way in which the tensions around his person will be resolved will be decisive for his immediate political future.

Romuald Wadagni (47 years old) – The current Minister of Economy and Finance is often cited as a possible technocratic dauphin. Appreciated for his technical skills and economic record (he gained visibility by piloting reforms and obtaining the cancellation of international debts), Wadagni has long evaded questions about his ambitions. As early as June 2022, he considered it “too early” to speak about 2026. But as the deadline approaches, his name is being mentioned with increasing insistence. According to observers, “it would not be surprising to see him in the race in 2026.”

A close collaborator of Talon, whom he advises on economic issues, Wadagni could appear as a compromise candidate benefiting from the support of the outgoing president while being less divisive than a pure politician. If he decides to run (possibly under the banner of the BR, of which he is a member, or the UPR if he joins), he would represent the new generation of the movement, focused on results and economic continuity. His main asset is his image as a serious manager, but his challenge would be to build a national political stature in a short time.

Mariam Chabi Talata (62 years old) – The current Vice President of the Republic deserves to be mentioned among the leading figures of the regime. A former teacher and the first woman to hold this position in 2021, she is a member of the UPR. Talata was Talon’s running mate during his re-election, symbolizing openness to women and the northern part of the country. Although no indication explicitly designates her as a potential candidate, her status and institutional experience place her as a possible contender if the majority seeks a unifying and faithful candidacy to Talon’s legacy. However, her low media profile and the fact that she does not have an autonomous partisan base make her less cited than other more active aspirants.

Other personalities – Before the events of 2024, Olivier Boko (intimate friend and eminence grise of Talon) and Oswald Homéky (former Minister of Sports) were considered serious aspirants. However, their political fate took a turn for the worse. Involved in a dark affair of an attempted coup d’état in 2024, Boko and Homéky were sentenced in January 2025 to 20 years in prison. Their elimination reshuffled the deck in favor of other profiles. Johannes Dagnon, a shadow advisor and cousin of Talon, was also among the mentioned dauphins, but he was abruptly dismissed after rumors presented him as interested in the succession. Similarly, Samou Séidou Adambi, a former minister, paid for his premature mention as a potential candidate with his eviction from the government. These successive dismissals thus seem to be a sign of Talon’s rigorous management of ambitions deemed undesirable. They have made way for a limited number of credible and disciplined contenders.

In this context, two profiles seem to stand out in 2025: Joseph Djogbénou on one side (for the UPR political wing) and Romuald Wadagni on the other (for the technocratic and/or BR wing). The final designation of the single candidate will undoubtedly depend on Patrice Talon’s arbitration between these options, unless a third consensual path emerges. Some mention the possibility of a surprise candidate, a less expected personality who would achieve consensus between the UPR and the BR. But whatever happens, the race remains largely underground and “ambitions hesitate to express themselves” openly, noted an editorial, as the fear of reprisals has long paralyzed the aspirants. We can expect things to accelerate once Talon officially gives the signal to launch the internal competition without risk.

Tensions and potential alliances

Despite the apparent calm—described as a “cemetery calm” around the political headquarters in Cotonou—recent events testify to a delicate end-of-reign period where everyone is sharpening their weapons behind the scenes. The spectacular conviction of Olivier Boko and Oswald Homéky in January 2025 had the effect of an electroshock, revealing a muffled succession war within the ruling clan. Many observers saw this as Patrice Talon’s desire to put an end to any internal “revolt” and to signify that “those who attempt to sound the revolt do so at their own risk and peril.”

This deleterious atmosphere leads some analysts to say that the presidential majority increasingly resembles a “crab basket,” where poorly channeled ambitions and personal rivalries risk imposing a tempo on Talon that he no longer fully controls. Internally, each camp is gauging the other. The UPR and BR are engaged in a silent arm-wrestling match to occupy the forefront, obtain strategic positions, and orient public policies to their advantage. Each party wants to position itself as the main heir to the presidential vision, even if it means creating friction in government coordination. For example, during recent budgetary arbitrations or administrative appointments, discreet tensions attributed to this competition between allies have been observed.

On the opposition side, these divisions within the majority are watched with interest. The Beninese opposition, embodied mainly by the Les Démocrates party (close to former President Boni Yayi), is also trying to unite behind a single candidate for 2026. Boni Yayi, although himself ineligible (having served his two terms before 2016), is active behind the scenes to federate the anti-Talon forces. Two names are emerging among the Démocrates: Éric Houndété (a political veteran, current first vice-president of the party) and Nourénou Atchadé (president of the opposition parliamentary group). According to some indiscretions, Yayi would lean towards Houndété for his unifying profile, while part of the base prefers the more combative tone of Atchadé. If the opposition manages to agree, it could present an unprecedented united front against the candidate of the ruling party. Furthermore, the potential rallying of Adrien Houngbédji (PRD) to this opposing camp—through a Houngbédji-Yayi alliance—is a scenario mentioned that could reshuffle the cards. Houngbédji and Yayi, two former rivals, have met several times at the beginning of 2025, which fuels rumors of a strategic rapprochement. Such a cross-cutting alliance would aim to coalize the southeast (PRD stronghold) and the center-north (Yayi stronghold) against the candidate of continuity. The presidential majority is undoubtedly keeping an eye on these maneuvers and knows that any disunity in its ranks would play into the hands of a united opposition.

State of preparation and prospects

Despite the challenges, the presidential majority displays robust organization in view of the 2026 elections. The two major parties continue the groundwork started during the 2023 legislative elections (where they obtained more than three-quarters of the seats together). The UPR claims more than a million members and is strengthening its local structures—it currently administers more than 40 municipalities in the territory. The BR, for its part, has recently set up or renewed its coordinations in key cities such as Porto-Novo, even attracting new recruits from former moderate opposition parties. The general staffs are also sharpening their arguments and will undoubtedly highlight the regained economic stability, completed infrastructure projects, and social reform (such as the recent legalization of abortion carried by Vice President Talata) to convince voters to continue on the same path in 2026.

The official electoral calendar is now known. The communal and municipal elections will take place in January 2026, serving as a first test, followed by the presidential election on April 12, 2026. By then, the Céna will publish the final list of retained candidates probably at the end of 2025, after the sponsorship stage (16 signatures from deputies/mayors are required for each duo). The presidential majority seems able to easily satisfy these sponsorships thanks to its overwhelming majority of local and national elected officials. The challenge will rather be to mobilize voters in a context where, since 2019, electoral enthusiasm has eroded. Beninese public opinion has been burned by previous elections marked by violence (2019 legislative elections) or the exclusion of opposition figures in 2021. Thus, a challenge for the pro-Talon parties will be to remobilize the base and strongly legitimize their future candidate, in order to avoid a high abstention rate or a contestation of the victory. Calls for an open and pluralistic competition are multiplying, and the government has an interest in giving the image of an inclusive and serene election to strengthen its democratic credibility.

It can be anticipated that once the majority ticket is known (around October 2025), the electoral machine will be set in motion through joint UPR-BR meetings, deployment of executives in the field, and undoubtedly the formal rallying of the two parties behind the chosen duo. A non-aggression pact has probably been sealed so that once the decision is made, everyone aligns without incident. Nevertheless, maintaining cohesion until the end will not be an easy task. Patrice Talon will play a role here as an arbitrator and guarantor of unity. His ability to keep the “troop” united will be decisive in approaching the 2026 campaign in a position of strength. Conversely, the slightest public division could be exploited by the opposition.