In Benin, a PPEA II bis right under the nose of Patrice Talon?
In Parakou, despite billions invested since 2016 to improve access to water and electricity, entire neighborhoods remain in short supply. Minister Paulin Akponna denounces a new “siphoning of the national budget,” reminiscent of previous disasters like the PPEA II scandal under Boni Yayi. Between internal score settle, political warnings, and crisis communication, his words reveal far more than a simple admission of failure.
SUMMARY
During a visit to Parakou on June 21, 2025, Minister Paulin Akponna denounced the mismanagement of public funds aimed at water and electricity during the tenure of former minister Séidou Adambi. He expressed sadness at seeing neighborhoods without water or electricity despite the “tens of billions” invested since 2016. He pointed to a “siphoning of the national budget” by certain local actors, accused of diverting several billion CFA francs intended for these essential projects. These officials, who had enjoyed the trust of the state, allegedly failed in their commitments by favoring their personal ambitions rather than collective interest. Akponna even calls the situation “criminal” and promises that these “siphoners,” now at large, will “answer for their management” before the law.
This discourse echoes the PPEA II scandal that happened during the term of former president Boni Yayi. The Multiannual Support Program for the Water and Sanitation sector (PPEA II) (2013-2015) was largely funded by the Netherlands, for a total amount of about 43.65 billion FCFA. In April 2015, an annual audit revealed a misappropriation of about 3 billion FCFA in this program. On May 6, 2015, in the face of the initial inaction by the Beninese government, Dutch Co-operation Minister Lilianne Ploumen suspended bilateral co-operation: Dutch aid was frozen until light was fully shed on the matter. Under pressure, the then Beninese Minister of Energy and Water, Barthélemy Kassa, suspected of being involved, had to resign on May 12, 2015 (while denying his involvement).
An international audit conducted by the Kroll firm in July 2015 confirmed the extent of the fraud: 2.6 billion FCFA of Dutch funds had been misappropriated in the PPEA II, and about an additional 5 billion had “disappeared” through other ministries. The Kroll report highlighted a fraud network involving senior managers of the General Directorate of Water, private operators, and mentioned that Barthélémy Kassa, then water minister, was aware of the shady deals but did not react. In response, the Yayi government took strong measures on paper: an extraordinary Council of Ministers on July 27, 2015, ordering legal proceedings against all the individuals named, the expulsion of the involved civil servants, the exclusion of the complicit companies from public contracts, and the referral of former minister Kassa to the High Court of Justice by Parliament. International arrest warrants were even announced against the fleeing perpetrators. These energetic actions convinced the Dutch side to resume co-operation. In September 2015, the Netherlands praised the measures taken while linking them to the gradual resumption of 95 billion FCFA of planned aid for 2014-2017.
However, despite this device, the legal outcome of the PPEA II scandal was disappointing. Two years after the scandal broke, in May 2017, the investigating judge pronounced a general dismissal. In other words, none of the indicted persons were ultimately convicted. For the record, besides Barthélemy Kassa (Minister of Water at the time), 12 other people – economic operators and administrative managers – were implicated. The dismissal surprised and outraged public opinion, especially since at the time all the evidence seemed to be gathered to establish the guilt of those implicated. Former Minister Kassa publicly rejoiced at the court’s decision, arguing that it confirmed his innocence. The judge justified the dismissal by revealing that the then Minister of Water (Kassa) and his Finance colleague had made orders reassigning unused PPEA II credits to other expenses (purchases of IT supplies, etc.). According to the judge, part of the funds would not have been “stolen” but administratively redeployed to other items – a technical explanation that led to the abandonment of criminal proceedings. However, for many Beninese, this conclusion illustrates a familiar frustration: “major financial scandals and nobody is punished.”
Rupture or repetition of the same pitfalls?
The arrival to power of Patrice Talon in 2016 was accompanied by a firm discourse of zero tolerance towards corruption. Talon positioned himself as the champion of rigorous governance, promising that the “money of Benin is no longer stolen” under his mandate. His government quickly took measures to settle the legacy of PPEA II and as early as June 2016, an amended budget included more than 2 billion FCFA to reimburse the loss suffered by the Netherlands. In September 2016, a new financing agreement relaunched potable water projects in 21 communes, introducing a more secure financial management mechanism (now, the funds no longer pass directly through the Directorate of Water but through the Autonomous Depletion Fund, SONEB, and the beneficiary communes, with more controls to avoid “fictitious markets”). These measures were aimed at preventing a “PPEA II” recurrence.
In addition, in 2018, Talon created a special jurisdiction, the Court for the Repression of Economic Offences and Terrorism (CRIET), displayed as the spearhead of the fight against corruption. Legal reforms, such as Law n°2018-13, strengthening the repression of economic crimes, were adopted. Politically, he initiated a reform of the party system (law on political parties, 2018) to prevent isolated individuals from using public resources to establish personal ambitions and escape justice under the cover of an elective mandate. This is what Paulin Akponna recalled in his speech, affirming that from now on, no actor will be able to divert public funds and protect themselves by seeking refuge in the National Assembly, because the parties are more structured and vigilant. This reference clearly targets past cases where personalities accused of misappropriation (like Barthélémy Kassa in 2015) were elected deputies to benefit from parliamentary immunity – a practice that the current government claims to want to prevent.
However, the reality under the Talon regime is more nuanced than a simple black/white contrast with the previous era. On one hand, progress is highlighted such as the Transparency International ranking which has improved, Benin ranked 78th in the world in 2021 (4th in Africa) with a score of 42/100, showing clear progress since 2018. This trend tends to show a perception of a decline in corruption in Benin. Furthermore, in its first few years, CRIET inflicted heavy sentences on some corrupt officials, creating a real fear of repression (“crietphobia”) within the administration.
On the other hand, several embezzlement scandals have continued to make headlines under Talon’s mandate, including involving people close to power. For instance, in 2021-2022, audits or investigations revealed misappropriations at the National Fund for Agricultural Development (FNDA), the Infrastructure Road Company (SIRAT), or the National Land Transport Agency (ANaTT). The ANaTT case caused a stir where an audit for 2016-2020 exposed a loss of more than 13 billion FCFA, due to fraud in vehicle registration. Proceedings were initiated and CRIET convicted some former ANaTT officials to prison terms in 2022 (though much lighter than the amounts at stake would have suggested). These cases show that corruption remains endemic, even within state agencies under the supervision of the so-called “Rupture” regime.
“corruption seems to resist the eradication mechanisms put in place by Patrice Talon”
Government detractors argue that if the fight were really effective, there wouldn’t be so many corruptions cases blooming in the administration. In this sense, some see it as a repetition of the same pitfalls of the past, albeit with new faces, rather than total eradication of the problem.
Akponna’s speech itself, although harsh towards the “delinquents of the Republic” who would have hidden the truth from President Talon, is also an implicit admission: recent public funds (from 2016 to 2024) have indeed been diverted or squandered without the executive noticing immediately.
It took this field visit to see that entire neighborhoods lack water and electricity when budgets had been allocated to these sectors. This suggests a supervision failure or an excess of trust towards certain local officials, which sadly recalls the PPEA II (where the scam was discovered late). The parallel is striking because in both cases, large sums intended to improve access to drinking water have been embezzled, leaving the population without basic services. The significant difference lies in the displayed reaction. Where the previous government was accused of slowness and laxity (until foreign partners intervened), the current regime highlights its reactivity and determination to punish those responsible. Akponna promises quick solutions, “as early as next week” for Parakou, to address the shortcomings observed, proof that the government and its party (the Republican Bloc) “keep their commitments” and refuse to let the situation deteriorate.
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