A few months before the presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire, scheduled for October 2025, Tidjane Thiam’s participation remains surrounded by uncertainties. While his popularity within public opinion and his roots in the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) are undeniable, legal and political obstacles are currently slowing his path towards candidacy.
Since his return to politics at the helm of the PDCI-RDA, Tidjane Thiam has faced several major controversies that weaken his presidential trajectory. The most decisive is his removal from the electoral list, officially due to administrative criteria related to his residency. This decision, if not lifted, would prevent him from running in the 2025 presidential election. Meanwhile, some critics reproach him for leading the party from afar, in France, which they deem incompatible with the realities on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire.
Additionally, there are internal tensions within the PDCI, fueled by his rapid rise and the sense of exclusion felt by some historical figures. Despite his international network, Thiam currently does not enjoy any clear diplomatic support, as foreign partners, notably France, maintain a position of neutrality. These factors combined fuel doubt about his ability to transform his popularity into an effective candidacy. Three main scenarios can be considered at this stage of the process.
1. A last-minute reintegration into the electoral list
Removed from the national electoral list, Tidjane Thiam cannot, under current law, submit his candidacy. The first scenario thus envisions lifting this removal through a new exceptional revision of the list. For this, a decision by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) or a court injunction would be necessary to allow the reopening of enrollment operations.
This scenario depends both on the political will of the authorities and a potential force balance created by the PDCI or other civil society actors. However, the government and the IEC have so far rejected calls for a new revision before the election, citing respect for the electoral calendar. Without a shift on their part, this path appears very narrow today.
2. An international support likely to tip the balance
The second scenario relies on a potential leverage effect exerted by Côte d’Ivoire’s foreign partners. A former top-tier banker, Tidjane Thiam has an extensive diplomatic and economic address book, which could, under certain conditions, be mobilized to argue his case.
But so far, official statements from key international players, notably France, lean towards a cautiously neutral position. During a hearing at the French National Assembly, Minister Jean-Noël Barrot reiterated that Paris neither intended to interfere in Ivory Coast’s internal affairs nor to disengage.
In the tense regional security context — with military transitions in the Sahel and cross-border threats — Côte d’Ivoire is perceived as a strategic partner and stability factor. This perception further reduces the likelihood of direct foreign pressure on the current power.
Even if Thiam’s networks remain active, they do not currently seem capable of influencing the institutional trajectory of the country.
3. Maintaining the status quo and the impossibility of candidacy
The third scenario, stemming from current elements, is one of a sustained stalemate. In the absence of an electoral list revision, and with the continuation of the removal, Tidjane Thiam’s candidacy would become impossible from a legal standpoint.
This scenario would open a turbulent period for the PDCI. Currently refusing the idea of a “plan B,” the party would find itself in a strategic deadlock as the deadline for submitting candidacies approaches. A repeat of the 2020 scenario — where several opposition forces opted for a boycott — cannot be ruled out. If this choice were repeated, it could marginalize the party on the electoral scene, with lasting political consequences.
At present, no scenario can be completely ruled out, but time works against the first option, and the discretion of the embassies weakens the second.